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THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE
JAMES L. BRIERLY*
In the early days of ourlegal history, when society was still too
weak to enforce the law by a system of legal punishments, our an-
cestors devised a rude procedure which we know as 'outlawry';
caput gerat lupinum, the court would decree, let the criminal wear the
wolf's head, and become like a wild beast whom it is every man's
right and duty to hunt down and kill. Outlawry therefore meant
quite frankly that the community went to war with one whom it
could not control by law, and there is certainly a strong dramatic
appeal in the choice of the term as a motto by one of the latest
American peace movements. War, it seems to suggest, is a wild
beast that we have been vainly trying to regulate by law; let us there-
fore outlaw it, declare war upon war. On the other hand, without
being overcritical of a catchword, which may well have its use if we
remember that it should be our servant and not our master, it is
worth pointing out that the analogy does not carry us very far.
As a matter of history recourse to outlawry, we are told, ' is one of the
. tests by which the relative barbarousness of various bodies of ancient
law may be measured'; it was a weapon 'as clumsy as it was terrible";
it was in fact a confession of the failure of law and not its triumph, for
it did not mean the substitution of law f6r war, but exactly the
reverse. Moreover in historical outlawry it was an individual that
was put outside the law, a rough and ready but at any rate a very
simple method of dealing with him; what we are now asked to outlaw
is a certain practice, a form of conduct which men at times adopt
towards one another, and the process of treating war in that way is
obviously a very different process from the other, and not nearly so
simple. We cannot in any literal sense put the wolf's head on to war,
and by merely calling the process 'outlawry', we do not even indicate
a plan of campaign for our metaphorical war against war. By a
curious inversion modem 'outlawrists' seem to use the term not to
mark the abdication of law, but as a call for its extension into a new
and hitherto unappropriated field; and though we need not quarrel
over the use of a word, it is important that the old associations, in
particular the idea of the rough simplicity of the process, should not
be carried over to the new meaning. By all means let us agree that
*Chichele Professor of International Law, Oxford University.
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war is a thing altogether evil, that it threatens to engulf our whole
civilization unless it can be eradicated, and, as I at any rate should
hope, that it is not an inherently necessary evil, but one that can be
eradicated if we have the wisdom to find the way and then to make
the sacrifices of immediate interests that will be called for. There will
still, however, remain the question of a plan, and in particular the
question what part should be assigned to law? How far are we
justified in looking upon law, in this case international law, as an in-
strunent which can take the place that war has traditionally held in
the relations of states?
To this question a very confident answer is given by the present
movement for the 'outlawry of war', of which a clear, and what I
take to be a more or less authoritative, account has recently been
given by Dr. Charles C. Morrison;2 and as the views contained in this
article are radically opposed to those of Dr. Morrison's book it may
be well at the outset to make it clear that the difference is solely one
of judgment upon the method by which his purpose is likely to be
attained. For since law is only one of the elements of which the
social life of men and nations is built up, and since Dr. Morrison's
scheme, as he insists more than once, 'moves wholly on the juridical
plane', I should have thought that some inquiry into the potential-
ities and limitations of law, and the conditions in which it is or is not
likely to function successfully, would have been relevant to his
purpose. Dr. Morrison, however, draws a curious distinction
between "an interest in international law, as such", which he dis-
claims, and the interest in it of "a builder of peace", which is much as
though a builder were to insist on the best work in brick-laying and
plumbing, while disclaiming any interest in either of those trades 'as
such'; although this disclaimer does not prevent him from claiming
that his proposals "rest on sound juridical foundations ' 4. No
proposal looking towards a reformed international order can avoid
giving judgment either expressly or by implication on the part that
law should play in such an order; but it is curious how common is
this habit of assuming that that part can be determined with dog-
matic confidence on a priori reasoning. The builders of peace seldom
seem to ask themselves such questions as these: What part is the law
playing in international relations as things are? Why is that part a
I
2MoRRISON, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR; a constructive policy for world peace
(1927).
3p. 157. Possibly the explanation of this distinction lies in another mis-
conception to the effect that existing international law "is practically a code of
war" (p. 99). 4p. 154.
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relatively minor one? How does it come about that law plays a
larger part in our relations as individuals? Why is it that it some-
times breaks down even there? Yet there is probably no other
department of social organization in which it would be considered
profitable to propound schemes of reform without research into
the relevant experience. It is far from my intention to suggest that
international law, or law in general, is a mystery to be reserved for
specialists; on the contrary the evidence is available upon which any
intelligent man can form an opinion. I merely plead that dissatis-
faction with the existing order ought not to be regarded as a sufficient
equipment for prescribing specific plans of reform in matters of inter-
national organization any more than it would be in any other social
field, and that international law cannot be cast for any part in the
scheme that happens to be vacant without regard to its special
aptitude, or the context in which it is expected to function. It is
the object of this article to suggest, partly by way of criticism of the
overwhelmingly important part which Dr. Morrison assigns to it,
that international law is not and cannot be made a panacea, and
therefore that any scheme which "moves wholly on the juridical
plane" is founded on a false simplification of a very complex problem.
The book has four main theses;5 (i) "that the problem of war must
be disentangled from all other controversies, and, thus isolated,
brought directly before the nations for a yes or no decision;" (2)
"that war is an institution-legal, established, sanctified, and su-
preme;" (3) "that it can be abolished only by disestablishing it, by
casting it out of the legal system of the nations in which it is en-
trenched;" and (4) "that its disestablishment can be made effective
only by establishing in its place an institution of peace conceived not
under political but under juridical categories. This can be done only
by a basic change in international law."
(i) If we can imagine a plebiscite taken of mot6rists for a 'yes orno
decision' on the question whether motor accidents should or should not
continue to occur, the answer would hardly be doubtful, but it would
not necessarily follow that they would drive with any greater care and
skill, and unless they did so, accidents would continue to occur.
War is in the same case; those who desire war for its own sake in any
nation are so few as to be negligible, and if it were possible to 'dis-
entangle' war from everything else and to 'isolate' it, it would have
been abolished long ago. The diiculty of abolishing it only exists
because in every country there are many who desire ends the pursuit
of which may in fact, as things now are, lead to war, and there are
5P. xxviii.
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many more who believe, or can be persuaded that they believe,
those ends to be legitimate and worthy of their patriotic support.
In other words nations, like motorists, are perpetually taking risks;
they do not desire war, any more than the motorist desires a collision,
and generally their dangerous policies do not lead to war, just as
generally bad driving does not lead to an accident; but in the hun-
dredth case the war or the accident does happen. No foundation,
therefore, for a scheme of international order could be more un-
promising than one which starts with the assumption that 'world
peace is a question all by itself; it is a yes or no issue in international
relationships, requiring not at all the previous or the concomitant
solution of any other controversial question', or with the idea that it is
possible to 'lift the war and peace question' far above the tides and
clouds of politics. 6 For how can a political event, such as war is, be
lifted out of politics? War persists merely because the horror of it,
sincere and wide-spread though it is, is not always strong enough to
deter one nation from pursuing some particular 'policy' which con-
tradicts some other 'policy' which another nation is equally de-
termined to pursue, and the project of outlawry does not propose to
change this state of things one jot. On the contrary it proposes care-
fully to preserve intact the 'sovereign right of a nation to attend to
its own business'7 ; and unfortunately we all live on the same planet,
and some of us have a habit of managing or mismanaging our 'own
business' to a degree that others find intolerably inconvenient. We
shall take the first step towards the elimination of war from inter-
national life when we cease to think in terms of our sovereign rights to
attend each to our own business, and begin to think more of what we
owe to the legitimate interests and even to the susceptibilities of
other nations; which is but to say that our plans will have to move
on the 'moral', and not 'wholly on the juridical plane'.
(2) What is the present attitude of international law to war?
To say that it is an institution 'sanctified and supreme' is merely a
rhetorical exaggeration which explains nothing. Very briefly sum-
marized the facts are that for centuries the theory of international
law made a distinction between lawful and unlawful occasions of war,
just as every tolerable system of municipal law makes a distinction,
both in theory and practice, between the lawful and the unlawful
uses of force; but that this distinction was never accepted by states in
their practice, and its retention in the theory merely gave unreality to
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says that "international law has no alternative but to accept war,
independently of the justice of its origin, as a relation which the
parties to it may set up if they choose". No one suggests that this is a
tolerable state of the law, and it is the law merely because it reflects
the practice which has hitherto prevailed between states! If the
states can be induced to alter their practice, there will beno difficulty
about altering the law; but merely altering the law, even if there were
any way in which that could be done except by the action of the
states, would not affect the practice. The truth is of course that
international relations, and with them and as part of them inter-
national law, lag hopelessly behind the general march of civilization;
they stand today much on the footing of baronial relations in the
disorderly days of feudalism. The explanation of the present attitude
of international law towards war is merely that a primitive age-and
internationally we live in such an age-has the law it deserves, a
primitive system of law; and it is idle to think that the law can be
lifted to the level of our national systems of law except as part of a
process in which the relatively civilized practice of our national lives
is extended to our international relations.
(3) We are warned not to think of the outlawry scheme as an
attempt to abolish war by fiat, for it is said to be 'a proposal to or-
ganize the world for peace'9. Whether the charge is really rebutted,
will depend on the character of the organization proposed, and this is
dealt with under the fourth of Dr. Morrison's theses. Here it is
sufficient to repeat that war does not persist because it is tolerated by
international law; it is only tolerated in law because it persists in fact.
(4) The institution which the outlawry scheme proposes to es-
tablish in the place of war is a court of law; and the essentials of a
real court of law, we are told, are three, a body of judges, a definite
code of law, and 'affirmative' jurisdiction, i.e. jurisdiction to summon
a nation to its bar and to hear the complaint against it whether or not
it enters an appearance. 0  The primary statute of the code will-
make war in any form and under any guise a 'public crime'n; 'the.
breath of life and of power' will be breathed into the system by a
universal treaty between the nations, 'that they renounce forever
and unconditionally the immemorial right to resort to war for the
settlement of international disputes, that they agree to accept the
jurisdiction of the court in all disputes covered by the code or arising
9p. 110.
'Op. 144. It is interesting to note that these requirements would exclude all
English courts and those of some American states.
npp. 38-39.
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under treaties, and that they will accept in 'good faith and abide by
the decision of the court in all cases'. The court however will deal
only with 'international disputes; disputes over domestic policies of
the nations are not within its jurisdiction 2, and whether a dispute
falls within its jurisdiction or not will be determined by the code as
interpreted by the court itself. Dr. Morrison admits that the line
between "disputes that are obviously international in character" and
those involving "the sovereign right of a nation to attend to its own
business" may be difficult to draw; still the line will be drawn by the
makers of the code, that is to say, by the nations themselves. Peri-
odic revision of the code is to be provided for. As to disputes not
falling within the court's jurisdiction Dr. Morrison will have nothing
to do with proposals for their compulsory arbitration. "In the case
of the United States we have only to think of tariffs, and immigration,
and the Monroe Doctrine, and prohibition, and the Allied debts, to
see how a meddlesome nation, under cover of our pledge to arbitrate any
dispute whatsoever, could provocatively precipitate an issue which was
none of its business-in any sense which an independent country like
the United States would acknowledge--and then demand that we go
to arbitration with it. Illustrations similarly involving Great Britain,
France, and other nations abound. Thus imposed upon, and taken
advantage of, any self-respecting nation would be driven to repudiate
its arbitration agreement without hesitation and without compunc-
tion.' 3 These disputes, however, would be covered by the absolute
ban against war. So that the 'proposal to organize the world for
peace' turns out to be merely a proposal to establish a court and a
code of law. If my object were merely to criticise Dr. Morrison's
scheme, I should have much to say in answer to his arguments that
the existing Permanent Court of International Justice neither is at
present, nor can be reformed so as to become, a real court of inter-
national justice.1 4 But the real objections to such a proposal lie
deeper than the eccentricities of a particular exponent.
The radical vice of the scheme for 'outlawing' war is the funda-
mentally materialistic basis of its thought. We are really concerned
with a great problem of human conduct, for 'law' and 'war' are
merely abstract terms by which we denote two contrasted ways in
1p. 64. '3pp. 68-9.
14The value of these arguments may be estimated by noting that the writer is
under the impression that the Statute of the Court "expressly forbids the use of
a previous decision as a precedent" (p. 42); that the Court is a court of "arbi-
tration"; and that on that account it is "susceptible of political shuffling and
manipulation" (p. 220). For this charge no evidence is produced and none exists.
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which men behave towards one another. No doubt since language is
never more than an imperfect vehicle of thought, it is permissible
and inevitable that we should to some extent hypostatize these
abstractions; but if we ever allow ourselves to forget that this is what
we are doing we shall easily be led astray. War is 'entrenched' in
the legal system; we are to make a 'frontal attack' on war; inter-
national law is to be 'blamed' for the League's impotence in relation
to war; war is to be cut out of the 'tissue' of law; these perpetually
recurrent metaphors, (often, curiously enough, military metaphors)
would be harmless, if one could feel that they belonged only to the
language, and not also to the underlying thought, of outlawry.
But the scheme is in fact a capital illustration of three funda-
mental materialistic fallacies with regard to the nature of inter-
national law, fallacies which are not often held in the crude form in
which they appear in Dr. Morrison's book, but which are yet suffi-
ciently common in the thought of laymen on international law to
deserve a reasoned refutation. Stated in the baldest form these
fallacies are (i) that international law is a self-acting force; (2) that it
admits of manufacture by processes of mass production; and (3) that
its primary function is to be an instrument for the settlement of
disputes.
(i) When Dr. Morrison quotes Mr. Levinson as saying that "Not
until the will of mankind throws the irresistible weight of the majesty
of the law on the moral side, by destroying war's institutional status,
by condemning and outlawing it, will this plague of plagues, which
has baffled and shamed religion and civilization ever be extermi-
nated"15 , we may suppose that neither of them really believes law to be
a body of irresistible weight; but such metaphors tempt us to imagine
that somehow there is an inherent force in a rule of law, whereas on
the contrary law is a very delicate highly specialized instrument of
social progress, which easily degenerates into formalism or worse if
its special aptitudes are disregarded. Instances abound of the failure
of law or legal institutions when roughly transplanted to the soil of an
alien civilization, and of the disrespect into which they fall when
they have ceased to reflect the prevailing social conscience on the
matters which they profess to regulate. In such cases we may be
sure that this delicate instrument, the law, has fallen into unskilled
hands; the mistake has been made of treating it as though it were a
material thing, instead of being, as it is, a part of the institutional
framework of a civilized society, and depending on other elements in
that framework for its meaning and vitality. How insidious is the
1p. 93.
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notion of law as an irresistible force is very clearly seen in Dr. Morri-
son's use of historical analogies to illustrate the power of a legal
prohibition to abolish a noxious social institution. In his hands all
these analogies are so many boomerangs which really show the utter
dependence of law for its effectiveness on other social factors. Thus
"the nations," he says, "made piracy an international crime.. .the
institution was outlawed. The nations simply said, we want no more
piracy, we want piracy made a crime, and their jurists formulated
the laws to punish any found guilty of it. The international slave
trade was outlawed in the same way."'1 6 Now piracy decayed for
many reasons, of which the chief was that the better policing of the
seas made the trade too dangerous; in certain waters where there is a
fair prospect of a safe field of operations and of markets in which to
dispose of booty it still survives today. But the most instructive
point about this analogy is that the law had declared pirates to be
hostes humani generis centuries before they began to disappear, and it
does so today in places where piracy is rife. The duel, we are told
again, is "a match for the war system almost point for point, the two
being dissimilar, as institutions, only in the fact that war involves
nations while the duel involves two individuals. War is simply
duelling on an international scale... It was disestablished by law
and disappeared.' 17 It would be difficult to put more inaccuracies
into a few words than are contained here. In actual fact the duel
had hardly anything in common with war except its etymology; it
was a fashion, a vice of a tiny minority of the population of certain
countries at certain times, a debased relic of chivalry; it was no more
the result of the clash of two competing wills, each determined to
bend the other to its purpose, as war is, than is a modern prize fight.
And again it is not historically true to say that it was eradicated by
being made illegal; English law, for example, regarded death by duel
as murder long before a change of social fashion abolished it in
England, and the law of every country, so far as I know, where
the duel still survives today, brands it as an illegal practice. But
perhaps the analogy which is most fatal to the case for outlawry is
that of slavery. "All the world knows that the act by which slavery
was outlawed was no highly complicated one involving great subtlety
of statecraft. In America the thing was done by means of writing
into the federal constitution these few simple words: 'Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to its jurisdiction...' As we look back
17p. 98.16p. 98.
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upon the history of America's procedure against it the most amazing
aspect of its abolition was the simple technique by which it was ac-
complished. A few words written into the constittitional law of the
land, expressive of the profound public determination to have done
with the institution forever, were the medium of its utter destruction.
The law which had been on the side of the infamy was now turned
against the infamy, and slavery disappeared."' 8 One is inclined to
tbink that when President Lincoln said, "I do not want to issue a
document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoper-
ative like the Pope's bull against the comet," he had a truer insight
than this implies into the part that the victorious forces of the Union
would have to play in making these "few simple words" effective.
Mr. John Bassett Moore has suggested 9 that it is unreasonable to
expect that international wars will cease before civil wars do so;
and it is certainly curious that those who are interested in the prob-
lem of international war, and especially in the attitude of inter-
national law towards war, so seldom seem to realize how very in-
structive for their purpose would be an examination of the problem of
civil wars. The latter, though they are generally on a smaller scale,
are far commoner events than international wars; in the last decade
there have been civil wars in Russia, China, Finland, Ireland, and
there have been no international wars. The only reference that Dr.
Morrison appears to make to this part of his problem is in the course
of an appeal for the extension to the whole world of the juridicial side
of the American Federal system, the result of which would be, he
thinks, that "international war will be cast down from its present
legitimate institutional status and abandoned and prohibited by the
nations as the states of the American Union have abandoned and
prohibited it."20 At this point he notes that the prohibition did not
prevent the Civil War; but that war, he explains, was not analogous to
an international war, because it was a "rebellion". No doubt, but to
the inhabitants of the Shenandoah Valley the distinction probably
seemed unimportant. "The effect of the outlawry of war wouldbeto
make war between nations illegal and criminal, as wars of rebellion
are now." That again is true, but it is more relevant to know whether
it would make them less frequent. For the significant lesson that the
persistence of civil wars ought to teach us is the liability in certain
conditions of a legal prohibition of war, even when backed by the
whole organized system of a state government, to break under a
18pp. 102-103.




sufficient strain. If we could discover and formulate the conditions in
which this is likely to happen, I suspect that we should make an
important contribution towards the elucidation of the problem of
international war. For since war is completely 'outlawed' in every
state and yet is liable to occur in any, it clearly cannot be the mere
fact of outlawry that normally preserves a condition of internal peace,
for that fact is unaltered when civil war breaks out; and there is no
reason to think that outlawry as between state and state would give a
higher degree of security against the occurrence of international war.
(2) There is no real difference of opinion on the question of the need
for more and better law in international relations. Nor would there,
I suppose, be any difference about the need for more of many other
desirable things; but it does not follow that the same wholesale
methods of manufacture are applicable to all of them. When Hooker
wrote that, "Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that her
seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world", he
may have been using language which rings strangely in modern ears,
but he was at least telling us a truth that we easily forget, that law
belongs to the spiritual and not to the material side of our lives.
International law has hitherto been, and for the most part it still is,
essentially a system of customary law, which means that it belongs to
a type of law which is characteristic of a very simple primitive com-
munity. Such growth as it has made has not until very recent times
been the result of purposive action at all; it has been assumed that
the slow processes by which new customs get themselves accepted and
others fall into desuetude would suffice for the needs of international
life. No modern international lawyer regards that state of things as
tolerable today; everyone is agreed that deliberate action stimulating
the growth of the law, and comparable in some degree to the legis-
lative processes that are constantly going on within the state, is an
urgent and vital need. But it is foolish to shut one's eyes to the
reality of the difficulties of such a process, which are partly technical
and partly inherent in the nature of the task.2' On the technical side
there is the absence of any true international legislative machinery;
the only substitute is an international conference, in which there is
not and cannot be any provision entitling the will of the majority
to prevail over that of the minority. If we imagine Congress or
21Dr. Morrison's references to the League Committee on Codification, besides
showing that he does not know the nature of the task entrusted to the Committee,
contain no less than three misstatements of fact, and I can personally vouch for
the inaccuracy of his conjecture that the members spent their time 'playing golf
or pinochle'!
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Parliament attempting to work under such conditions, the magnitude
of a merely procedural difficulty like this will be obvious. But that is
not all. The agreed work of a quasi-legislative conference could only
come into force if it were ratified; and I would ask Americans to
think of the traditional attitude of their own Senate towards the
ratification of treaties, and then to remember that before inter-
national legislation can take effect it must run the gauntlet of more
than fifty such bodies, each with similar powers of rejection or of mak-
ing reservations and each exposed to the distracting influences of do-
mestic politics. But apart from these technical difficulties of the
international legislative process it is obvious that an agreement
on the law would be of real value only in spheres in which either
differences at present exist as to what the law is or what it ought to
be; in those departments of the law where the nations already hold
identical views, no difficulty can arise as things are. But where such
differences do exist, they are rarely a matter of accident; they exist
because the nations have different interests on the matters concerned,
so that if agreed principles of law are to be laid down at all, con-
cessions must clearly be made by some, and probably by all, nations.
I do not think that discussions of the problems of codification usually
attach sufficient importance to this factor. It is so very easy to
assume that the concessions, if any are required, will be made by
other nations, whose views are so obviously less reasonable than our
own; it is very easy to assume that, until one meets the represen-
tatives of the other nations in conference, and finds precisely the same
assumption rooted in their minds. Nothing could be more misleading
than to imagine that codification is a task requiring merely technical
legal skill which can be handed over to the lawyers; their special
training will be needed as advisers, and for the work of draftsmanship,
but the questions of policy, and especially the question what sacri-
fices each country is prepared to make, cannot be for them. This
point is so pervasively important in the task of codification that it is
worth while to indicate the sort of problem which is inevitably raised
at every turn. Let us suppose that nationality is one of the subjects,
as it clearly ought to be, on which it is decided to promote international
legislation. At present we have the scandal that many persons are
without any nationality at all, and that others have more than one.
The prime reason of this unsatisfactory state of affairs is obvious;
it is simply that some nations, including Great Britain and the nations
of North and South America, take the principle of the fus soli as the
basis of their law, while others take the jus sanguinis. A satisfactory
solution can only be obtained if one of these groups of nations, or
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both, will make concessions from their cherished principle to the
other, and a group of competent lawyers could draft provisions to
that effect in a few hours. But when we begin to enquire why each
group respectively cherishes its own principle, the difficulty begins to
appear less tractable. The Americas are countries of immigration;
they, or at any rate the United States, believe in the 'melting-pot';
they do not wish that the loyalty of an American born should be
claimed by the country to which his parents may have belonged.
On the other side are the countries of emigration; they do not care to
admit that by crossing the sea their citizens or their descendants
sever the ties of interest or of sentiment that bind them to the home
of their ancestors. Both views are entitled to sympathy, but the
conflict is only superficially juridical; it is a conflict of national
interests.
Agreement on a code is nothing but an agreement on a thousand
and one detailed provisions of the law, and no apology is needed
therefore for another illustration indicative of the sort of details upon
which agreed solutions are immensely difficult. The American
Congress has recently departed from the traditional principle by
which a married woman takes the nationality of her husband. It is
not necessary to consider whether the change was wise or not; Congress
for sufficient reasons evidently thought that it was. From the
international codifier's point of view the important thing is that
opinion in most other countries probably prefers the old rule, and
thinks that it better meets the interests and even the wishes of most of
the women concerned. Is the American Congress going to retrace its
steps, or must the rest of the world, the majority, follow its lead?
No doubt the point might be left unsettled, and no really serious
harm would be done; but that is true of any particular provision of a
proposed code. In fact, desirable as agreed solutions on inter-
national legal matters are in themselves, it is a delusion to think that
these are the matters about which, in the absence of a solution,
nations go to war.
(3) It is merely another aspect of what I have called the materialist
view of law that it should be thought of as primarily a convenient
means for the settlement of disputes. Lawyers and laymen alike
are prone to confuse law with litigation; the lawyer, because the
nature of his business makes litigation always present as a fact or a
possibility, the layman, because most of what he reads or hears
about the operation of law relates to this side of it. But actually
litigation-the settlement of a dispute which has come to an issue-is
only an incident, and not the essence, of law; it belongs to the path-
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ology and not to the healthy operation of a legal system; it is no
more the whole of law as a social institution than the curing df disease
is the whole of hygiene. For our present purpose the serious result of
regarding law as nothing but a means of settling disputes is that we
tend to forget or fail to inquire why it is that law can be used effec-
tively in this way at all. And yet the reason is plain; it can-be so
used because and in so far as the law is a way of life, because indi-
viduals within a state normally observe the standards it lays down
in their personal relations, and conduct their business on the ac-
cepted understanding that it shall regulate their mutual rights and
obligations. If this were not so, there would be no virtue in law as
such which could save us from ourselves at the crisis of our disputes.
The primary function of law, like that of medicine, is not to be cur-
ative, but preventive; and its curative function, which is secondary
and derivative, is only possible so long as our disputes are occasional
and not normal,* and so long as most of us in our normal relations
limit our freedom of action and follow certain principles of conduct
whose object is the reduction of the inevitable friction that social
life engenders.
The efficacy of law as a means of settling the disputes of states
depends in exactly the same way on their readiness, as yet very
limited, to accept law as the rule of their normal relations. Existing
international law, uncodified though it is, is already effective to
settle a host of minor disputes between states, and it is so used in an
increasing number of controversies every year; and the reason that
this is possible is because in minor matters, that is to say, in matters
not necessarily unimportant in themselves, but about which it is
hardly conceivable that in any event they will go to war, the states
do already accept international law as their rule of life. International
law is not used today to settle the major disputes of states, disputes
in which their so-called 'vital interests' are concerned, not because
the law is not codified, nor because the jurisdiction of international
courts is not compulsory, but for the much more fundamental reason
that the states refuse to submit their policies on such matters to any
rule of law, because they claim that their policies, even though they
may injure the interests, or offend the susceptibilities of other nations,
are 'domestic' matters within their own 'sovereign right' of sole
decision. While that is so, law cannot settle the issue when the
policies of two states conflict.
Law and courts of law do their work in a well-ordered state, be-
cause they are an inseparable part of a highly complicated organi-
zation for the adjustment of conflicting interests, because in the
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widest sense of the word they are a part, but not the whole, of social
government. But it is impossible, without creating a superstate,
which is neither a possible nor a desirable ideal, to establish 'govern-
ment' in the international sphere. Can we, however, establish some
international substitute for government, some measure of organi-
zation which will at least create the environment in which law will
have a chance to grow and to perform internationally something like
the same service that we demand from it in our national life? That
would be a proposal really "to organize the world for peace", in a
sense very different from that in which Dr. Morrison uses that phrase;
a proposal for a revolution much greater than any that is dreamed of
in the philosophy of outlawry. I have no prophecy to offer. I can
only see that it means a complete reversal of the tendency towards
aggressive nationalism that seems in the ascendant today; that it
involves in particular the cessation of the practice of placing political
power at the ready service of the economic interests of individuals;
and that it calls for a tolerance of differences and a sympathy with
others which is not yet common in any country. But there is sun-
shine as well as clouds in the international sky today.
